Following I've copied an article from AllAfrica.com that does a really great job describing Islam as it exists here in Mauritania and how recent unsettling events fit in with that. If you want to understand a little bit more about the people I live with, please read (or at least skim) it.
Between Islamism And Terrorrism
Fahamu (Oxford)
ANALYSIS
13 May 2008
Posted to the web 15 May 2008
By Armelle Choplin
In the space of a few weeks, Mauritania suffered a number of terrorist
attacks, responsibility for which was claimed by Al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb. Radical Islamism is not new in Mauritania, but terrorism and
the sheer scale of violence witnessed in these acts is unprecedented.
Although radical trends are on the rise, this should not be confounded
with terrorism, which has not taken root in Mauritania. In this case,
the threat originates elsewhere.
On the 24th of December 2007, Christmas Eve, four French tourists
were brutally killed in Mauritania. It quickly became apparent that
this was not an ordinary crime, but rather a terrorist attack. Two days
later, three soldiers were killed at the Al Ghallawia military base in
Northern Mauritania. The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), formerly the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) claimed responsibility for the attack.
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On the 5th of January 2008, the organizers of the Paris-Dakar rally
decided to cancel the race, following advice from the French government
that has been on high alert against terrorist threats in Mauritania,
where most of the attacks have taken place. On the night of 1st
February, 2008, Nouakchott's biggest night club the "VIP", and the
adjoining Israeli embassy were targeted: six gunmen opened fire,
injuring a French woman and two French Mauritanians. Once again
Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb claimed responsibility.
Mauritania, previously a little-known country, suddenly hit the
headlines. Straddling the Arab and Black world in this Sahara-Sahel
"grey area", suspicious of the West, particularly the US, Mauritania is
today awash with Maghrebin extremists whose influence continues to
grow. This is a radical shift from the past when Mauritania professed a
tolerant form of Islam that was open and receptive. Recently, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that Islamic fundamentalism
had only a limited foothold in Mauritania due to a socio-religious
system based on ethnicity and under the control of powerful Islamic
brotherhoods that curtailed the rise of extremist ideas (ICG, 2005).
In this paper we shall attempt to raise a number of key points that
may serve to explain the current sequence of events and debunk the oft
-proffered links between Islamism and terrorism. This analysis is by no
means exhaustive, given the sheer complexity of the situation in
Mauritania.
It is noteworthy that the central government has always had an
ambiguous policy towards Islam in general and in particular Islamist
movements. This brief exposé will give us a better understanding why
these movements are attracting a following, in an environment
characterized by despair and growing poverty - ideal conditions for the
rise of dissent. We must however emphasize that the Mauritanian
Islamism has no directly linked to these acts of terror perpetrated in
the name of foreign terror groups such as the AQIM, in this case.
From the Islamic Republic, to the rise of Islamism in Mauritania
The official name " Islamic Republic of Mauritania" can be
misleading, since an Islamic state is nothing more than a Muslim state.
However there has been a rapid lexical shift from "Islamic" to
"Islamist", the "Islamic Republic" of Iran under Khomeini as an
oft-quoted example. Iran under Khomeini, however, bears little
similarity to the "Islamic Republic of Mauritania", that has always
espoused a more "tolerant" brand of Islam.
The appellation was adopted upon attaining independence, and was a
response to the political aims of Mauritania's first president, Mokhtar
Ould Daddah, who envisioned the country as a bridge between North
Africa and Black Africa. In order to overcome the dual cultural
identity and ensure cohesion between the Moors and the "Black
Mauritanians" (Halpulaar, Soninke, Wolof), Islam was brought to the
fore. This lent legitimacy to the Mauritanian state and brought
together a 100% Muslim nation.
Colonel Haidar came to power in 1980 and sought to further entrench
Islam and it practice in the country. To this end, Sha'ria law was
enacted in 1982. Maouiyya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya took over in 1984 and
maintained the trend, instituting restrictions on, among other things,
alcohol. Come 1990, Taya was under immense external pressure to
"democratize" the country. In this new climate, Islamists were
prevented from active involvement in politics: in 1991 Taya further
eroded their influence by banning the formation of religion-based
political parties.
Between 1994 and 2005, there were numerous arrests, followed by
equally frequent pardons. This was part of a government strategy to
harass these groups rather than openly fight them. Taya frequently
asserted that there was no place for Islamism in Mauritania, since
everyone was Muslim. According to the ICG (2005), the Taya regime was
in effect using the "Islamic threat" to gain the support of the West
and detract from the frequent calls for greater democracy in the
country.
Following the coup of 3rd August 2005, there was a radical change of
policy towards Islamism. The Military Committee for Justice and
Democracy (CMJD) came to power and embarked on democratic renewal. It
sought to distance itself from the coercive methods that Taya used in
his 20 years of power. The CMJD, led by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall,
immediately began consultations with civil society and bringing about
democratic reforms. In this climate of change, the Islamists quickly
re-emerged. The members of the CMJD committed to exclude themselves
from the presidential elections in order to restore civilian rule. The
March 2007 presidential elections were the culmination of the
democratic transition initiated by the military junta, and Sidi Ould
Cheikh Abdallahi was democratically elected as Head of State.
The new government was similarly tolerant of Islamism. In June of
2007, several individuals accused of being members of an Islamist
organization were acquitted for lack of evidence. As it turns out,
among those acquitted was Sidi Ould Sidna one of those accused of
murdering four French tourists. This shift in attitude is further
evidenced in the registration of Tawassoul (National Congress for
Reform and Development), led by Mohamed Jemil Ould Mansour, a moderate
Islamist. The party holds a parliamentary seat in the heart of
Nouakchott, a clear symbol of its legitimacy.
For some, this new attitude towards Islamism, smacks of connivance.
For others, it is reassuring, and symbolizes a "restoration of the
Faith", manifest in the return of the Muslim weekend (Friday and
Saturday), the construction of a mosque at the presidential palace, and
frequent raids and arrests at bars and restaurants in Nouakchott
suspected of selling alcohol..
A state of socio-economic crisis ripe for conflict
The "democratic transition" and the installation of a new elected
government gave the population a renewed sense of hope for change. The
transition was widely hailed and held up as an example. At the same
time, Mauritania joined the elite group of petroleum-exporting
countries. The sinking of an offshore well in 2006 brought about
economic renewal and raised expectation. However, petroleum production
had to be reviewed following technical glitches and the fact that only
a small minority was reaping the economic rewards.
Three years after the discovery of oil and the start of the
transition, hope and enthusiasm had given way to despair and anxiety.
On the one hand, Mauritanians quickly realized that the much-touted
"democratic transition" was only relative - it was still the same cabal
holding the reins of power. On the other hand, the population noticed a
decline in living standards, in contrast to the promised growth fueled
by the famous "oil find" and the redistribution of resources following
the democratic transition. In the autumn of 2004 the breakout of "bread
riots" in several towns following the rise of consumer prices pointed
to social breakdown. These social conditions led to a growth of
sympathy for extremist views.
These views called for a moral regeneration in government, and
resonate with poor citizens who watched Nouakchott's skyline dotted
with an increasing number of palatial residences, each more opulent
than the last. Never before had luxury been more conspicuous. People
began to question the source of this newfound wealth. Corruption was
suspected. Development aid given to a country seen as a good example
was regularly misappropriated.
The new government claimed to fight against scourge, with few
results. The drug trade was also very lucrative, and the country was
now seen as a hub for Mafia networks. There have been a number of
arrests in recent months, one involving the son of ex-president
Haidallah. There is a widening gap between the public and the urban
elite with its questionable western values.
The radicalization of the discourse and growing unrest are most
visible in the urban milieu, which is rich in debate and vociferous
expression, and highly politicized. There have been massive waves of
rural-urban migration in the last thirty years, following long periods
of drought. The capital Nouakchott was built from scratch in 1957, and,
with its 1 million inhabitants, provides the clearest example of this
spectacular urban grown (Choplin, 2006). The Neo-urbanites are
connected to various information networks: the Arabic language
channels, notably Al-Jazeera, and the Internet. In fact, it is in these
urban areas that citizens gain a sense of their marginalization and
seek to have their voices heard (Choplin, Ciavolella, 2008).
In the face of rising poverty levels, some have turned to highly
critical political movements. Wahhabi Islamic readings, spread through
Saudi influence and Islamist NGOs, began to appear in the poorer parts
of town. Sociologist and expert in Mauritanian Islam, Yahya Ould El
Bara (2003) showed the rise in the number of mosques in the last few
years: between 1967 and 2003 the number rose from 17 to 617. Of these,
322 were run by benefactors from the Persian Gulf, a further 17 of
which were distinctly fundamentalist in character.
The most notable of these fundamentalist mosques is in an
impoverished part of the city. A large number of the faithful at this
mosque are young 'haratin' (descendants of former slaves) who are
particularly drawn to the egalitarian discourse of so-called pure Islam
(ICG, 2005). The haratin eschew the Mauritanian form of Islam that has
never questioned the oppressive traditional social hierarchies. In
fact, fundamentalism provides a means to challenge the hegemony of the
Marabout tribal chiefs who see themselves as the custodians of the
religion.
Mauritanian Islamism versus foreign terrorism
This growth of the fundamentalist discourse does not mean that all
Mauritanians are followers of Bin Laden, ready to perpetrate acts of
terror. Rather, the Mauritanian public has been quick to denounce these
acts, whose motives it does not share. The murder of four French
citizens drew a lot of popular indignation and reproach. Even though
the VIP club was not viewed in a popular light, and was seen as a venue
frequented by foreigners, and where alcohol, prostitution and drugs
were common currency, the attack was roundly condemned.
Those who attacked the Israeli embassy clearly sought to condemn the
Mauritanian government's decision to bow to US pressure and establish
diplomatic ties in 2000. Even though many Mauritanians, particularly
the moors, who hold a great affinity to the Arab world, have always
been strongly opposed to these political ties, there was no support for
this attack. Likewise, many Mauritanians reacted with disappointment to
the cancellation of the Paris-Dakar Rally, puzzled at how their country
had overnight transformed from a "peaceful country" into "a dangerous
enemy of the West".
It must be noted that however radical Mauritanian Islam might be, it
has never condoned acts of terror, as the case may have been elsewhere
(Kepel, 2000; Roy, 2002; Gomez-Perez, 2005). Islamist parties clearly
proclaim that they have never called on their followers to use
violence, and have no links whatsoever to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. In a
recent interview with RFI, Jemil Ould Mansour, a moderate Islamist
leader, roundly condemned the acts of terror, attributing them to
isolated groupings. The terrorist threat is thus seen to originate
outside the country, and have no ties to local groups. Another telling
fact is that after the murder of the French citizens, the attackers
fled to neighboring countries, indicating the absence of a Mauritanian
rearguard to protect them.
Therefore the supposed links between Islamism and Islamist terrorism
do not hold water in the case of Mauritania. Today, ordinary citizens
are alarmed by the authorities' apparent inability to control the
situation. They continue to distance themselves from terrorism through
public demonstrations and numerous articles in discussion forums. It
still begs the question, however, whether the growing disaffected
radical groups may consider acts of terror in the future. The line
between the two realities holds for the moment, but could easily become
porous, if the number of locals leaving to join foreign "Jihadist"
groups is anything to go by.
* Armelle Choplin (armelle.choplin@gmail.com) lectures in geography
at l'Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée. She is also an Associate
researcher at UMR PRODIG, where she completed her studies, and
currently conducts research on Urbanization in Mauritania and Sudan.
The original article in French can be found at http://echogeo.revues.org/document4363.html
The article also appeared in the French language edition of Pambazuka News: http://www.pambazuka.org/fr/category/features/47831
* Translated by Josh Ogada
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